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Abstract
Using an administrative data set containing daily information on individual workers’ employment
histories, we investigate how workers’ labour market transitions are affected by international out-
sourcing. In order to do so, we estimate hazard rate models for match separations, as well as for
worker flows from employment to another job, to unemployment, and to out of the labour force.
Outsourcing is found to have no significant impact on job stability in the manufacturing sector,
but it is associated with increased job stability in the service sector. Furthermore, especially in
the service sector the effect of outsourcing varies across skill levels. An analysis of the different
labour market flows shows that labour market transitions are not affected symmetrically by in-
ternational outsourcing.
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1 Introduction
Fears of economic competition from low-wage countries are widespread among workers, trade unionists
and politicians in many industrialized countries. The concern is that economies with relatively high
labour costs are adversely affected by labour demand shifting towards economies with lower labour
costs, thereby reducing job stability and increasing unemployment. One mechanism which is suspected
of leading to such an evolution is international outsourcing, which occurs when a domestic firm
subcontracts a (production) process to another firm in a foreign country.
While a number of theoretical papers has underlined the importance of international outsourcing
for relative labour demand and factor prices (see, for instance, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a; Arndt,
1997; Deardorff, 2001; Kohler, 2004) no consensus has yet emerged in this regard. Depending on
the specific modelling approach, low-skilled workers may lose or benefit from outsourcing. More im-
portantly, the theoretical contributions generally assume full employment and perfect factor mobility
and are, hence, silent about the net employment effects of outsourcing, not to mention the impact
on labour market dynamics in the short-run. While in the public debate international outsourcing
is mainly associated with employment losses, it should be noted that outsourcing may also induce
employment growth by increasing the competitiveness and the productivity of firms (cf. OECD,
2007).
In this paper, we analyse the effects of international outsourcing on the dynamics of the German
labour market, i.e. on the stability of job matches, as well as on worker flows. The case of Germany
is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, Germany is the largest economy in the European
Union. Second, it is one of the most open economies in the world, regularly featuring the highest
level of exports worldwide. Third, in Germany international outsourcing has grown substantially
over recent years. While outsourcing is still more important in manufacturing, during the 1990s
growth rates have been considerably higher in the service sector (cf. Horgos, 2007). Finally, there
is evidence that West Germany experienced a significant increase in economic turbulence, defined as
the pace of structural change, during the 1990s (cf. Bachmann and Burda, 2008). The acceleration
of international outsourcing is a natural culprit for this development.
We are not the first to analyse the effects of international outsourcing on the German labour
market.1 However, in contrast to the existing literature, we investigate the effects of international
outsourcing on labour market dynamics by looking at worker flows. In particular, we focus on the three
flows resulting from the separation of an employer-employee match: direct job-to-job transitions, the
flow from employment to unemployment, and the flow from employment to nonparticipation, i.e. out of
the labour market. The distinction between these three labour market transitions is important because
1See the next section for a discussion of the literature.
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a match separation can have very different reasons and consequences. For example, a separation may
be initiated by the worker, who has found a better job. This will in all likelihood result in a direct
job-to-job transition. A separation can also be the consequence of a lay-off, in which case the worker
has a relatively high probability of becoming unemployed - this entails a transition from employment
to unemployment. The worker may even become discouraged to the extent that he leaves the labour
market altogether. These different transitions have very different welfare implications, both for the
affected worker and for the economy as a whole. In order to assess the consequences of international
outsourcing, the distinction between these three flows is therefore crucial.
Our analysis also takes into account the fact that international outsourcing increasingly affects
sectors outside manufacturing, such as the service sector. In order to analyse the effects of outsourcing
in manufacturing and services, we use a very large micro data set covering 2% of the dependent-status
German employees. As it is derived from administrative records, the data set has the further advantage
of featuring very little measurement error, as well as being exact to the day. It is thus possible to
follow individual labour market transitions, including direct job-to-job flows, in a very exact way.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we give a brief review of the relevant liter-
ature. The third section describes the data set used, while the fourth section presents the econometric
method. The fifth section contains our estimation results. The last section summarizes the results
and concludes.
2 Existing Literature
There now exists a sizeable empirical literature that investigates the labour market effects of interna-
tional outsourcing. In particular, its impact on relative labour demand and the wage skill premium
has been widely discussed (see, for instance, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b, and Feenstra and Hanson,
1999, for the US; Geishecker and Go¨rg, 2007, for Germany; Hijzen, Go¨rg, and Hine, 2005, for the
UK). However, the literature is much thinner when it comes to the effects on transitional labour
market dynamics. On the micro-level the issue at hand has only been addressed by Munch (2005),
Pfaffermayr, Egger, and Weber (2007), and Geishecker (2007).2
Pfaffermayr, Egger, and Weber (2007) examine the importance of outsourcing (and trade) for
the year-to-year transition probabilities of employment between sectors. Using a random sample of
Austrian males, the authors estimate a multinomial logit model with fixed effects. They distinguish
between six labour market states: employment in four different sectors, unemployment, and out-of-
2In addition, Kletzer (2000) studies the effect of outsourcing on industry-level displacement rates. However, studies
on the industry-level may suffer both from an aggregation and an endogeneity bias (see, for instance, Geishecker, 2007,
for more details.)
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the-labour-force. The individual data is matched with industry-level trade and outsourcing indicators
that are, however, only available for the manufacturing sector. The study shows that the probability of
staying in or changing into the manufacturing sector falls as the level of international outsourcing rises.
This finding is more pronounced in manufacturing industries that have a comparative disadvantage.
Munch (2005) analyses the effects of international outsourcing on individual job separations. The
paper concentrates on the Danish manufacturing sector and combines individual yearly spell data with
indicators for international outsourcing at an industry-level. Provided that outsourcing is broadly
defined, the estimation of a single risk model documents a (small) positive effect of outsourcing
on the job separation rate.3 Distinguishing between job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transition
flows, the author also estimates a competing risk model. Outsourcing is found to increase both the
unemployment risk and the job change hazard rate.4 The former effect is stronger for low-skilled, the
latter for high-skilled workers. Munch (2005) concludes that the quantitative impact of outsourcing
on out-of-the-job transitions is relatively small.
In a related contribution, Geishecker (2007) analyses the effect of international outsourcing on
work-to-non-employment transitions in the German manufacturing sector. Combining monthly individual-
level spell data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) with industry-level outsourcing measures, the
study estimates a discrete time hazard model. Geishecker (2007) finds outsourcing, when narrowly
defined, to markedly increase the probability of leaving employment. In contrast to Munch (2005),
the effect does not differ across skill groups but increases with employment duration.
The paper at hand contributes to the existing literature on the effects of international outsourcing
on labour dynamics in several respects. First, instead of analysing yearly (Pfaffermayr, Egger, and
Weber, 2007; Munch, 2005) or monthly (Geishecker, 2007) transitions, our data set contains infor-
mation on the labour market status of workers on a daily basis. This allows us to consider also very
short employment periods and permits a more thorough treatment of duration dependence. Second,
to the best of our knowledge the present study is the first one that also considers the service sector.
While international outsourcing is still relatively limited in the service sector, existing studies point
to a very dynamic development in recent years (cf. Horgos, 2007, for the German economy). Further-
more, we distinguish between the competing risks of making job-to-job, job-to-unemployment, and
job-to-non-employment transitions. While Munch (2005) has implemented a similar framework in his
analysis of Danish data, no comparable study exists for Germany.
3However, the outsourcing term is rendered statistically insignificant when a narrow concept of outsourcing is em-
ployed instead.
4Narrow outsourcing has only a statistically significant effect on the unemployment hazard of low-skilled workers
and the job change hazard of high-skilled workers.
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3 The Data
3.1 The IAB Employment Sample
The data set used is the IAB Employment Sample 1975-2004 (IABS), which is provided by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The data base covers
2% of all the persons who, between the 1st January 1975 (for western German employees) or the 1st
January 1992 (for eastern German employees) and the 31st December 2004, worked in an employment
covered by social security. The data source consists of notifications made by employers to the social
security agencies, which include health insurances, statutory pension schemes, and the unemployment
insurance agencies.5 These notifications are made on the behalf of workers, employees and trainees
who pay contributions to the social insurance system. This means that, for example, civil servants
and the self-employed are not included. Overall, the subsample includes over 1.29 million people, of
which 1.1 million are from western Germany. For 1995, the employment statistics, from which the
IAB Regional File is drawn, cover nearly 79.4% of the employed persons in western Germany, and
86.2% of all employed persons in eastern Germany. As for the unemployed, only those entitled to
unemployment benefits are covered.
For the labour market states of employment and unemployment, the following spell information
is available: the starting and ending date of the spell, exact to the day; sex, year of birth, degree
of education/training, and the region of the workplace (in case of an employment spell) or of the
unemployment office paying benefits (in case of an unemployment spell). For employment spells, there
is additional information on the occupation and the gross earnings of the worker, an establishment
number, the size of the establishment, and the economic sector. Furthermore, the information for
employment spells is updated on an annual basis. A third labour market state, “non-participation”,
is not directly recorded in the data set, but can be inferred. A worker is in this state if she does not
work full time and does not receive unemployment benefits. This means that non-participation can
coincide with the state “out-of-the-labour-force”. However, it can also mean self-employment, civil
service employment6, retirement, or marginal employment.7
The advantages of the data set are thus as follows: first, it does not suffer from the problems
inherent in most panel data sets, e.g. there is no sample attrition, and it follows workers over a long
period of time because there is no need for rotation as in the CPS. Second, it offers observations at
a very high frequency, which means that every actual transition is observed. Again, this is a distinct
5For a complete description of the data set, see Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) and Drews (2007).
6This applies to “Beamte”, public sector employees under a special, life-time form of civil service employment. Other
workers in the public sector are included in the data set.
7Cf. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) for an in-depth analysis of this issue.
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advantage over survey data like the CPS or the SOEP, which do not record multiple transitions that
take place between two interview dates and, in the case of the SOEP, uses retrospective data and does
not record all direct job-to-job transitions.
Worker transitions can be inferred from the employment and unemployment histories in the data
set. We consider transitions between two labour market states (employment to unemployment or
employment to nonparticipation), as well as transitions from one job to the other (direct job-to-
job transitions).8 It has to be taken into account that there might be measurement error in the data
because of the way the data are collected. In particular, workers’ notifications of becoming unemployed
might not always correspond exactly to the actual change of labour market state. For example, this
can arise when a worker gets laid off and does not report to the unemployment office immediately. We
correct for this latter potential measurement error in the following way: If the time interval between
two records (employment or unemployment) is smaller than 45 days, then this is counted as a direct
transition between the two states recorded.9 If the gap between two notifications is larger than 45
days, then this is counted as an intervening spell of non-participation.
3.2 Industry-level Data
The most important indicator on the industry level for our purpose is the outsourcing indicator, which
measures international outsourcing. The latter is considered to be a make-or-buy decision. A firm can
either produce a given (intermediate) input in-house or buy it from a (foreign) supplier. Outsourcing
is then reflected in the foreign content of domestic production and can be measured by the share of
imported intermediate inputs in total production. We concentrate on international outsourcing in a
narrow sense and define it as the shift of a (two-digit) industry’s core activities abroad. For instance,
intermediate products that the textile sector in Germany imports from some foreign textile sector will
count as international outsourcing. On the contrary, intermediates imported from a foreign food sector
by the German textile sector will not be taken into account.10 Consequently, the outsourcing intensity
of an industry is measured by the value of intermediate inputs imported from the same industry abroad
relative to the total production value of that industry. Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), the
8The notion of a job in the data set is establishment (not firm) based.
9We did the calculation for smaller intervals as well. This does not change the results significantly.
10Alternatively, a broader concept would account for the total sum of imported intermediate inputs. However, the
narrow indicator should arguably better reflect international outsourcing. When the latter is considered to be the
result of a make-or-buy decision, only those imported intermediate inputs that could be produced within the respective
industry should correspond to international outsourcing. Hence, a wider definition is usually considered to be too broad
(cf. Feenstra and Hanson, 1999).
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outsourcing indicator is calculated as
OUTnarrowjt =
IMPjt
Yjt
, (1)
where IMPjt indicates the value of imported intermediate inputs from industry j abroad and Yjt
gives the production value of industry j in period t.
Data on imported intermediates and production values are obtained from Input-Output tables of
the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002). Information is provided at the
NACE two-digit sector level (WZ93). Comparable figures are currently only available for the period
1991 to 2000. Figure A.1 shows the development of international outsourcing for the manufacturing
as well as for the service sector.11 While international outsourcing has increased significantly in both
sectors, the service sector has displayed much stronger growth rates in the 1990s. Nevertheless, in
absolute terms outsourcing still plays a much larger role in manufacturing.
Unfortunately, the industry classification WZ93 is used in the IABS data only from 1999 onwards.
For the previous period, workers are assigned to industries according to the older WZ73 classification.
Since no recoding scheme exists at present, the re-assignment of workers from WZ73 to WZ93 sectors
was done manually. We used the finer three-digit WZ73 classification provided in the IABS dataset and
assigned each WZ73 sector to one of the sectors distinguished between in the WZ93 classification.12
The recoding was then tested for the years 1999 and 2000, for which both classification schemes exist in
the data. Observations that could not be classified with a certain degree of precision had to be deleted
from the dataset.13 In the two years tested, the misclassification error amounted to approximately 5
per cent.14
Further industry-level measures used in the empirical analysis are the production value and the
capital-output ratio. The former is again taken from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistis-
ches Bundesamt, 2002) while the latter is computed from data of the OECD STAN and the EUKLEMS
data base (cf. Koszerek, Havik, Morrow, Ro¨ger, and Scho¨nborn, 2007). Finally, we include regional
unemployment rates as provided by the German Federal Employment Office (Bundesagentur fu¨r Ar-
beit, 2007).
11The manufacturing sector consists of the NACE sectors 15 to 37 while the service sector comprises NACE sectors
50 to 93. Sectors 50 to 74 are classified as private services.
12Some sectors had to be pooled to avoid ambiguous assignments.
13We deleted any WZ73 observation that could not be assigned to a WZ93 sector with a precision of at least 75 per
cent. Increasing the threshold to 85 and 95 per cent, respectively, does not change our results in a qualitative sense.
14A detailed overview of the re-assignment can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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4 Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy
In order to analyse the effect of international outsourcing on the hazards of job separation and of
experiencing different labour market transitions, we estimate hazard rate models. As our dataset
contains daily information on individual workers’ employment histories, we use a specification in
continuous time. Since econometric theory offers little guidance on choosing a functional form for the
hazard function, we opt for a semi-parametric approach and estimate a piecewise-constant exponential
(PCE) model. In contrast to parametric approaches the PCE model allows for more flexibility in the
shape of the hazard function and, unlike the Cox proportional hazards model, it provides explicit
estimates of the baseline hazard function. The PCE model is an example of a proportional hazard
model. Therefore, the conditional hazard rate of leaving employment θ(t,X) satisfies the separability
condition:
λ(t|X) = λ0(t)exp(β′X) (2)
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, and λ0 denotes the baseline hazard. The PCE model
assumes that the baseline hazard is constant within a specified time interval but does not impose
further functional form assumptions. The baseline hazard is then a step function with k segments
λ0(t) = λm, aj−1 ≤ t < aj , j = 1, ..., k. (3)
We specify five such segments: 0 to 182 days of employment duration, 183 to 365 days, 366 to 1095
days, 1096 to 2920 days, and more than 2920 days.
Even though we control for a wide array of observable characteristics, the hazard rate of observa-
tionally equivalent individuals may still differ from each other. Ignoring such unobserved heterogene-
ity in duration models produces incorrect results (cf. Lancaster, 1990). To account for unobserved
heterogeneity, the proportional hazard model is extended to allow for a multiplicative unobserved
heterogeneity term υ.15 The hazard function then becomes
λ(t|X, υ) = λ0(t)exp(β′X)υ, (4)
where υ follows a Gamma distribution, a choice rationalised by Abbring and Van den Berg (2007),
and is assumed to be independent of regressors and censoring time. The heterogeneity term is shared
across different spells of a given individual, causing observations within groups to be correlated.
The hazard of job separation involves one single risk. In a first step, we can therefore simply
estimate the above model for this hazard. In a second step, we distinguish between the different
destination states of a worker leaving a job. We thus estimate the competing hazards of transiting
15This is called a mixed proportional hazard model. See Van den Berg (2001) for a survey of this model class.
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from one job to another, from employment to unemployment, and from employment to nonpartic-
ipation. For continuous time models and in the absence of a correlation between the destination
specific unobserved heterogeneity terms, the log-likelihood for a model with three destinations can be
partitioned into the sum of three sub-contributions, each of which depends only on parameters of a
single destination-specific hazard. The overall likelihood can then be maximised by maximising the
three component parts separately (cf., for instance, Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002). Accordingly, the
competing risk model is estimated as a number of single-risk duration models, one for each of the
three destinations. Spells ending in any destination other than the one considered are treated as right
censored. Thus, the above model is estimated separately for each of the three competing risks.
As described in Section 3.2, we use an outsourcing indicator measured at the industry level as an
explanatory variable. Because this indicator is common to several individuals, the standard errors
are potentially subject to a downward bias (cf. Moulton, 1990). This is due to the fact that such
aggregate explanatory variables do not provide independent information for each individual. Following
Geishecker (2007), we argue that the data do not allow us to correct for this problem directly, i.e.
through clustering, because the number of clusters is small relative to the number of observations.
Instead, we include industry and region fixed effects, as well as linear time trends for every industry.
This corrects for residual correlation within clusters due to time-invariant, and, in the case of the
industry trends, time-variant unobserved heterogeneity.
We also want to make sure that the outsourcing indicator does not capture effects which are
industry-specific, but unrelated to international outsourcing. Therefore, in addition to fixed effects
and time trends, we also include the production value and the capital intensity for every industry.
Furthermore, monthly dummies are used to take seasonal effects into account. Finally, yearly dummies
and regional unemployment rates capture differences in economic conditions over time and across
regions.
5 Estimation Results
The results for the hazard of match separation, as well as for the hazards of the three transitions
(EE, EU, EN) for the manufacturing sector are in Tables A.2 and A.3. The corresponding results
for the service sector are in Table A.4 and A.5. Apart from the coefficients on outsourcing and
interactions with outsourcing, the results are generally in line with the literature on labour market
flows (cf. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). First, there is negative duration dependence, i.e. the
hazard of separating or of making a specific labour market transition falls with match duration. This
is generally attributed to the accumulation of human capital and sorting effects (cf. Machin and
Manning, 1999). Second, men are considerably less likely to separate from their employer. As an
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inspection of the individual flows reveals, this is despite the fact that they experience more direct
job-to-job transitions than women. This is outweighed by the fact that they are much less likely
to become unemployed or non-employed, which is probably to a large extent due to women playing
a more important role for child care at home than men. Third, the match separation - age profile
displays a U-shape. The jobs of young and old employees are much less stable than jobs of middle-aged
employees. Young employees have a high probability of experiencing a direct job-to-job transition, as
they engage in job-shopping at the beginning of their working lives (cf. Neal, 1999). Older workers,
on the other hand, have a higher probability of leaving the labour market due to retirement, which
implies an EN flow. Fourth, foreigners have a higher probability of separating than German nationals,
which is entirely due to the fact that they leave the labour market more often. Fifth, employees with
low skills and employees with high skills have less stable jobs than employees with medium skills.
For the former, this is mainly due to higher inflows into unemployment and flows out of the social
security work force. For the latter, lower inflows into unemployment are outweighed by higher job-
to-job transitions and higher flows out of the social security work force. Finally, firm size is generally
negatively correlated with the hazard of separating.
The coefficients on the outsourcing indicator as well as the interactions of this indicator with skill
yield the result we are most interested in, the impact of international outsourcing on the different
hazard rates. For the manufacturing sector, the results for the hazard of job separation indicate that
international outsourcing has no statistically significant effect on overall job stability (cf. Table A.2).
Indeed, no statistically significant effect can be established for any of the three skill categories as
illustrated in the first column of Table A.3. However, the single risk model may mask important
effects of outsourcing on the destination-specific hazards.
In fact, the estimation results for the different transition hazards show that international out-
sourcing increases the hazard of job-to-non-participation transitions in the manufacturing sector. Not
distinguishing between different skill groups, the estimates imply that a one percentage point in-
crease in the international outsourcing intensity increases the hazard of leaving the social security
work force by about exp(0.026) − 1 = 2.6 per cent. Including interaction terms between skill and
outsourcing shows that the effect is most pronounced for medium-skilled workers but also applies to
workers with low and high skills (however, for these two groups the effect is only significant at the 10%
level). In contrast, no effect is found for job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions for either
skill group. Comparing our results to Geishecker (2007), the only comparable study for Germany, our
results suggests that his finding of a negative effect of international outsourcing on individual employ-
ment security is mainly driven by the job-to-non-participation transitions. Interestingly, we generally
confirm Geishecker’s result that in the manufacturing sector the effect of international outsourcing
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appears to be strongest for medium-skilled workers.
For the service sector, the regression result for the hazard of match separation is very different from
the result obtained for the manufacturing sector (cf. Tables A.4). In particular, outsourcing increases
job stability in the service sector. An inspection of the results for the different flows shows that this is
due to the fact that outsourcing is strongly, and negatively, correlated with the hazard of experiencing
a direct job-to-job transition.16 A possible explanation for this at first sight surprising finding is
that international outsourcing, by increasing the division of labour and thus the specialization of
production, is likely to lead to higher levels of competitiveness and productivity of firms. This may
translate into higher wages and better job prospects. If job-to-job transitions are to a certain degree
voluntary,17 international outsourcing, by allowing firms to offer more attractive jobs, increases job
stability as it induces workers to stay with their employers.
Alternatively, and in sharp contrast to the previous explanation, the result may hint at declining
employment prospects of industries that increase their outsourcing intensity. This should arguably
also lower workers’ inclination to leave their job voluntarily, which lowers direct job-to-job transitions.
While the argument can not be conclusively dismissed, the results for the other two hazards do not
support this view. In particular, for the service sector, we do not find any evidence for international
outsourcing to decrease employment security, i.e. to increase the hazard of job-to-unemployment and
job-to-non-employment transitions. On the contrary, including interaction terms between outsourc-
ing and skill levels shows that employment security of high-skilled workers even increases with the
outsourcing intensity of an industry: the hazards of making a transition to unemployment and to
non-participation both fall for high-skilled workers (cf. Tables A.5). This may again point to a rise
in firms’ labour demand due to outsourcing boosting productivity and competitiveness. Neither of
these two hazards are affected by international outsourcing for low-skilled and medium-skilled work-
ers. Therefore, for these worker groups, the increase in job security that goes along with international
outsourcing is entirely due to a decrease of the hazard of making a direct job-to-job transition.
The general result obtained is thus that the effects of international outsourcing on labour mar-
ket dynamics in Germany differ markedly between sectors, across skill levels, and for destination-
specific hazards. In the manufacturing sector, outsourcing appears to increase the risk of job-to-
non-employment transitions, especially for medium-skilled workers. On the contrary, job stability
16The magnitude of the coefficients is high, suggesting that an increase in the outsourcing intensity by one percentage
point will decrease the hazard of a job-to-job transition by 23.4 per cent. However, it has to be taken into account that
such an increase would be massive in the service sector, since the average outsourcing intensity amounted to just 1.3
per cent in the year 2000.
17It should be stressed that by no means all job-to-job transitions reflect voluntary job changes. The protection
against (instantaneous) dismissal in Germany allows workers to make direct job-to-job transitions even though they
were laid off against their will in the first place.
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increases in the service sector. In particular, international outsourcing has a sizeable negative effect
on the hazard of experiencing a direct job-to-job transition.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the impact of international outsourcing on job stability as well as on
workers flows from employment to another job, to unemployment, and out of the labour force. Our
analysis focussed on the German manufacturing and service sectors during the time period 1991-2000
and used a very large administrative micro data set covering 2% of German employees. Apart from the
large size of the data set, one of its main advantages is that employment spells are measured on a daily
basis, and that measurement error is likely to be very low. Using this panel data set, we estimated
hazard rate models for the hazards of separating, and of experiencing the three transitions mentioned
above. Outsourcing as measured by an indicator derived from input-output tables was included as an
explanatory variable in the regressions. We found significant differences between sectors and between
the different transitions. First, outsourcing was found to have no impact on overall in job stability in
the manufacturing sector, but to be associated with an increase in job stability in the service sector.
Second, our results indicate that the different transitions are affected asymmetrically by international
outsourcing, which can also explain the differences between sectors. In the manufacturing sector, only
the flow from employment to nonparticipation displayed a negative correlation with international
outsourcing. In the service sector, on the other hand, one important factor for the increase in job
stability is the decline in job-to-job transitions of low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Furthermore,
in this sector an increase in international outsourcing is associated with a decline in transitions from
employment to unemployment and from employment to nonparticipation for high-skilled workers.
The underlying reasons for the differences between sectors and labour market transitions remains a
matter of further investigation. There are two competing forces at work: on the one hand, international
outsourcing directly reduces labour demand by domestic firms, which reduces job stability, at least
in the short run. On the other hand, firms that engage in outsourcing increase their competitiveness
and their profitability. This has the potential of increasing employment, and leading to greater job
stability and lower labour market flows. The question why these effects differ between sectors and
skill groups is left for future research.
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Appendix A Appendix
Figure A.1: The degree of outsourcing in manufacturing and services in Germany, 1991-2000
Source: Input-output tables provided by the Germany Statistical Office and authors’ calculations.
Note: The outsourcing index is defined in equation 1.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
Manufacturing Service Sector
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Employment duration 0 - 6 months DD: 0-6 0.080 [0.271] 0.130 [0.337]
Employment duration 7-12 months DD: 7-12 0.061 [0.239] 0.099 [0.298]
Employment duration 13-36 months DD: 13-36 0.169 [0.375] 0.237 [0.425]
Employment duration 37-96 months DD: 37-96 0.260 [0.439] 0.273 [0.446]
Gender Male: yes 0.765 [0.424] 0.503 [0.500]
Age 18 to 24 Age 18-24 0.078 [0.268] 0.092 [0.289]
Age 25 to 29 Age 25-29 0.131 [0.337] 0.146 [0.353]
Age 30 to 34 Age 30-34 0.154 [0.360] 0.156 [0.363]
Age 35 to 39 Age 35-39 0.144 [0.351] 0.141 [0.348]
Age 40 to 44 Age 40-44 0.131 [0.337] 0.128 [0.334]
Age 45 to 49 Age 45-49 0.117 [0.322] 0.113 [0.317]
Age 50 to 54 Age 50-54 0.122 [0.328] 0.109 [0.312]
Age 55 to 59 Age 55-59 0.096 [0.295] 0.089 [0.284]
Age 60 to 65 Age 60-65 0.026 [0.150] 0.027 [0.161]
Foreign Nationality Foreign: yes 0.088 [0.284] 0.041 [0.199]
Low-skilled Worker Low skill 0.203 [0.403] 0.096 [0.294]
Medium-skilled Worker Medium skill 0.723 [0.448] 0.790 [0.407]
High-skilled Worker High skill 0.074 [0.262] 0.114 [0.318]
Establishment size 1 - 4 employees ES: 1-4 0.031 [0.173] 0.121 [0.326]
Est. size 5 - 9 employees ES: 5-9 0.038 [0.191] 0.086 [0.280]
Est. size 10 - 19 employees ES: 10-19 0.052 [0.221] 0.091 [0.288]
Est. size 20 - 49 employees ES: 20-49 0.093 [0.290] 0.147 [0.354]
Est. size 50 - 99 employees ES: 50-99 0.094 [0.292] 0.117 [0.321]
Est. size 100 - 199 employees ES: 100-199 0.120 [0.325] 0.113 [0.316]
Est. size 200 - 499 employees ES: 200-499 0.177 [0.382] 0.133 [0.339]
Est. size 500 - 999 employees ES: 500-999 0.123 [0.329] 0.079 [0.269]
Est. size 1000 - 4999 employees ES: 1000-4999 0.156 [0.363] 0.093 [0.291]
Est. size ≥ 5000 employees ES: ≥ 5000 0.113 [0.317] 0.016 [0.124]
Capital intensity K/Y 0.449 [0.105] 1.981 [1.686]
Production Value [in 1000] Prod. value 82.669 [46.818] 187.395 [152.308]
International Outsourcing OUT 6.594 [5.433] 0.609 [1.059]
Regional unemployment Unempl 9.420 [3.508] 10.652 [4.115]
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Table A.2: Estimation results for the manufacturing sector (I)
Sep EE EU EN
DD: 0-6 1.419 [0.015]∗∗∗ 1.011 [0.025]∗∗∗ 1.728 [0.026]∗∗∗ 1.411 [0.023]∗∗∗
DD: 7-12 1.127 [0.015]∗∗∗ 0.943 [0.025]∗∗∗ 1.738 [0.027]∗∗∗ 0.747 [0.026]∗∗∗
DD: 13-36 0.576 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.612 [0.021]∗∗∗ 0.909 [0.026]∗∗∗ 0.312 [0.023]∗∗∗
DD: 37-96 0.125 [0.012]∗∗∗ 0.252 [0.019]∗∗∗ 0.266 [0.025]∗∗∗ -0.071 [0.021]∗∗∗
Male: yes -0.303 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.283 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.462 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.782 [0.019]∗∗∗
Age 18-24 0.402 [0.014]∗∗∗ 0.181 [0.023]∗∗∗ 0.362 [0.030]∗∗∗ 0.762 [0.025]∗∗∗
Age 25-29 0.128 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.071 [0.021]∗∗∗ 0.107 [0.028]∗∗∗ 0.264 [0.024]∗∗∗
Age 35-39 -0.194 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.127 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.106 [0.030]∗∗∗ -0.408 [0.028]∗∗∗
Age 40-44 -0.294 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.198 [0.023]∗∗∗ -0.123 [0.033]∗∗∗ -0.660 [0.032]∗∗∗
Age 45-49 -0.309 [0.017]∗∗∗ -0.288 [0.025]∗∗∗ -0.037 [0.034] -0.636 [0.034]∗∗∗
Age 50-54 -0.238 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.360 [0.025]∗∗∗ 0.177 [0.032]∗∗∗ -0.456 [0.032]∗∗∗
Age 55-59 0.531 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.597 [0.030]∗∗∗ 1.415 [0.029]∗∗∗ 0.755 [0.027]∗∗∗
Age 60-65 1.447 [0.019]∗∗∗ -1.012 [0.062]∗∗∗ 1.806 [0.044]∗∗∗ 2.558 [0.031]∗∗∗
Foreign: yes 0.115 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.091 [0.026]∗∗∗ 0.119 [0.029]∗∗∗ 0.351 [0.024]∗∗∗
Low skill 0.216 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.057 [0.020]∗∗∗ 0.326 [0.022]∗∗∗ 0.357 [0.020]∗∗∗
High skill 0.103 [0.020]∗∗∗ 0.306 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.233 [0.047]∗∗∗ -0.075 [0.041]∗
ES: 5-9 -0.485 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.747 [0.033]∗∗∗ -0.503 [0.039]∗∗∗ -0.250 [0.040]∗∗∗
ES: 10-19 -0.533 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.800 [0.031]∗∗∗ -0.594 [0.038]∗∗∗ -0.283 [0.038]∗∗∗
ES: 20-49 -0.621 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.904 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.730 [0.035]∗∗∗ -0.341 [0.035]∗∗∗
ES: 50-99 -0.701 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.998 [0.029]∗∗∗ -0.847 [0.035]∗∗∗ -0.384 [0.035]∗∗∗
ES: 100-199 -0.754 [0.018]∗∗∗ -1.087 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.911 [0.035]∗∗∗ -0.404 [0.035]∗∗∗
ES: 200-499 -0.796 [0.017]∗∗∗ -1.176 [0.027]∗∗∗ -0.952 [0.034]∗∗∗ -0.415 [0.033]∗∗∗
ES: 500-999 -0.848 [0.019]∗∗∗ -1.268 [0.030]∗∗∗ -0.975 [0.037]∗∗∗ -0.459 [0.036]∗∗∗
ES: 1000-4999 -0.868 [0.019]∗∗∗ -1.343 [0.030]∗∗∗ -1.015 [0.038]∗∗∗ -0.416 [0.036]∗∗∗
ES: >5000 -0.989 [0.025]∗∗∗ -1.789 [0.041]∗∗∗ -1.340 [0.054]∗∗∗ -0.203 [0.044]∗∗∗
K/Y 1.254 [0.211]∗∗∗ 0.917 [0.347]∗∗∗ 1.739 [0.415]∗∗∗ 1.050 [0.367]∗∗∗
Prod. value -0.002 [0.001]∗ -0.006 [0.002]∗∗∗ -0.005 [0.002]∗∗ -0.001 [0.002]
OUT 0.002 [0.005] -0.012 [0.009] -0.005 [0.010] 0.026 [0.009]∗∗∗
Unempl -0.015 [0.007]∗∗ -0.052 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.056 [0.012]∗∗∗ -0.006 [0.013]
Failures 80939 28762 23278 28899
Further dummies included for occupation, economic sector, trend per economic sector, region, month, year
Base categories: DD: >96 months, Age 30-34, Medium skill, ES: 1-4 employees, Industry: machinery and
equipment, n.e.c., Occupation: (simple) manual labour, Year 2000, Month January
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
Data: IABS 1975-2004 and authors’ calculations.
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Table A.3: Estimation results for the manufacturing sector (II)
Sep EE EU EN
DD: 0-6 1.418 [0.015]∗∗∗ 1.011 [0.025]∗∗∗ 1.729 [0.026]∗∗∗ 1.409 [0.023]∗∗∗
DD: 7-12 1.126 [0.015]∗∗∗ 0.943 [0.025]∗∗∗ 1.739 [0.027]∗∗∗ 0.746 [0.026]∗∗∗
DD: 13-36 0.576 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.612 [0.021]∗∗∗ 0.909 [0.026]∗∗∗ 0.312 [0.023]∗∗∗
DD: 37-96 0.125 [0.012]∗∗∗ 0.252 [0.019]∗∗∗ 0.267 [0.025]∗∗∗ -0.072 [0.021]∗∗∗
Male: yes -0.302 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.283 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.462 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.780 [0.019]∗∗∗
Age 18-24 0.402 [0.014]∗∗∗ 0.181 [0.023]∗∗∗ 0.362 [0.030]∗∗∗ 0.762 [0.025]∗∗∗
Age 25-29 0.128 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.071 [0.021]∗∗∗ 0.107 [0.028]∗∗∗ 0.264 [0.024]∗∗∗
Age 35-39 -0.195 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.127 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.106 [0.030]∗∗∗ -0.408 [0.028]∗∗∗
Age 40-44 -0.294 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.198 [0.023]∗∗∗ -0.123 [0.033]∗∗∗ -0.659 [0.032]∗∗∗
Age 45-49 -0.309 [0.017]∗∗∗ -0.289 [0.025]∗∗∗ -0.037 [0.034] -0.635 [0.034]∗∗∗
Age 50-54 -0.238 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.361 [0.025]∗∗∗ 0.177 [0.032]∗∗∗ -0.455 [0.032]∗∗∗
Age 55-59 0.531 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.597 [0.030]∗∗∗ 1.415 [0.029]∗∗∗ 0.756 [0.027]∗∗∗
Age 60-65 1.446 [0.019]∗∗∗ -1.012 [0.062]∗∗∗ 1.806 [0.044]∗∗∗ 2.559 [0.031]∗∗∗
Foreign: yes 0.115 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.091 [0.026]∗∗∗ 0.119 [0.029]∗∗∗ 0.351 [0.024]∗∗∗
Low skill 0.253 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.044 [0.030] 0.319 [0.031]∗∗∗ 0.447 [0.029]∗∗∗
High skill 0.081 [0.027]∗∗∗ 0.267 [0.036]∗∗∗ -0.233 [0.065]∗∗∗ 0.013 [0.056]
ES: 5-9 -0.485 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.748 [0.033]∗∗∗ -0.503 [0.039]∗∗∗ -0.250 [0.040]∗∗∗
ES: 10-19 -0.533 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.800 [0.031]∗∗∗ -0.594 [0.038]∗∗∗ -0.283 [0.038]∗∗∗
ES: 20-49 -0.622 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.904 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.730 [0.035]∗∗∗ -0.343 [0.035]∗∗∗
ES: 50-99 -0.702 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.998 [0.029]∗∗∗ -0.847 [0.035]∗∗∗ -0.388 [0.035]∗∗∗
ES: 100-199 -0.755 [0.018]∗∗∗ -1.087 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.910 [0.035]∗∗∗ -0.408 [0.035]∗∗∗
ES: 200-499 -0.797 [0.017]∗∗∗ -1.175 [0.027]∗∗∗ -0.952 [0.034]∗∗∗ -0.420 [0.033]∗∗∗
ES: 500-999 -0.848 [0.019]∗∗∗ -1.267 [0.030]∗∗∗ -0.975 [0.037]∗∗∗ -0.463 [0.036]∗∗∗
ES: 1000-4999 -0.869 [0.019]∗∗∗ -1.343 [0.030]∗∗∗ -1.014 [0.038]∗∗∗ -0.421 [0.036]∗∗∗
ES: >5000 -0.991 [0.025]∗∗∗ -1.789 [0.041]∗∗∗ -1.339 [0.054]∗∗∗ -0.209 [0.044]∗∗∗
K/Y 1.256 [0.211]∗∗∗ 0.922 [0.347]∗∗∗ 1.739 [0.415]∗∗∗ 1.045 [0.367]∗∗∗
Prod. value -0.000 [0.000]∗∗ -0.000 [0.000]∗∗ -0.000 [0.000]∗∗ -0.000 [0.000]
OUT*low -0.003 [0.005] -0.015 [0.009] -0.004 [0.010] 0.017 [0.009]∗
OUT*med -0.003 [0.005] -0.013 [0.009] -0.005 [0.010] 0.031 [0.009]∗∗∗
OUT*high 0.006 [0.006] -0.007 [0.009] -0.005 [0.012] 0.018 [0.010]∗
Unempl. -0.015 [0.007]∗∗ -0.052 [0.010]∗∗ 0.056 [0.012]∗∗∗ -0.007 [0.013]∗∗∗
Failures 80939 28762 23278 28899
Further dummies included for occupation, economic sector, trend per economic sector, region, month, year
Base categories: DD: >96 months, Age 30-34, Medium skill, ES: 1-4 employees, Industry: machinery and
equipment, n.e.c., Occupation: (simple) manual labour, Year 2000, Month January
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
Data: IABS 1975-2004 and authors’ calculations.
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Table A.4: Hazard rate model for the service sector (I)
Sep EE EU EN
DD: 0-6 1.184 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.989 [0.015]∗∗∗ 1.975 [0.024]∗∗∗ 0.942 [0.015]∗∗∗
DD: 7-12 1.135 [0.010]∗∗∗ 1.123 [0.015]∗∗∗ 2.295 [0.024]∗∗∗ 0.562 [0.015]∗∗∗
DD: 13-36 0.620 [0.009]∗∗∗ 0.752 [0.014]∗∗∗ 1.414 [0.024]∗∗∗ 0.236 [0.014]∗∗∗
DD: 37-96 0.249 [0.008]∗∗∗ 0.395 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.658 [0.025]∗∗∗ 0.056 [0.013]∗∗∗
Male: yes -0.149 [0.006]∗∗∗ 0.228 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.230 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.522 [0.010]∗∗∗
Age 18-24 0.176 [0.008]∗∗∗ 0.263 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.140 [0.020]∗∗∗ 0.158 [0.014]∗∗∗
Age 25-29 0.069 [0.007]∗∗∗ 0.142 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.004 [0.018] 0.031 [0.012]∗∗
Age 35-39 -0.166 [0.008]∗∗∗ -0.091 [0.012]∗∗∗ -0.015 [0.019] -0.327 [0.014]∗∗∗
Age 40-44 -0.328 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.175 [0.013]∗∗∗ -0.071 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.687 [0.017]∗∗∗
Age 45-49 -0.397 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.255 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.027 [0.022] -0.814 [0.018]∗∗∗
Age 50-54 -0.399 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.341 [0.015]∗∗∗ 0.065 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.768 [0.019]∗∗∗
Age 55-59 -0.056 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.525 [0.018]∗∗∗ 0.738 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.163 [0.017]∗∗∗
Age 60-65 0.983 [0.012]∗∗∗ -0.868 [0.037]∗∗∗ 0.888 [0.036]∗∗∗ 1.840 [0.019]∗∗∗
Foreign: yes 0.251 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.074 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.026 [0.027] 0.693 [0.017]∗∗∗
Low skill 0.287 [0.008]∗∗∗ 0.058 [0.014]∗∗∗ 0.317 [0.017]∗∗∗ 0.523 [0.014]∗∗∗
High skill 0.009 [0.010] 0.117 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.249 [0.025]∗∗∗ 0.004 [0.018]
ES: 5-9 -0.257 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.255 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.351 [0.019]∗∗∗ -0.221 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 10-19 -0.280 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.249 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.450 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.233 [0.017]∗∗∗
ES: 20-49 -0.305 [0.008]∗∗∗ -0.246 [0.013]∗∗∗ -0.535 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.248 [0.015]∗∗∗
ES: 50-99 -0.296 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.227 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.637 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.198 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 100-199 -0.331 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.260 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.734 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.224 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 200-499 -0.384 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.302 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.848 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.285 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 500-999 -0.436 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.331 [0.017]∗∗∗ -1.013 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.316 [0.019]∗∗∗
ES: 1000-4999 -0.470 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.365 [0.017]∗∗∗ -1.125 [0.029]∗∗∗ -0.300 [0.019]∗∗∗
ES: >5000 -0.455 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.360 [0.033]∗∗∗ -1.216 [0.064]∗∗∗ -0.283 [0.037]∗∗∗
K/Y 0.250 [0.059]∗∗∗ 0.717 [0.086]∗∗∗ -0.017 [0.148] -0.005 [0.103]
Prod. value -0.003 [0.001]∗∗∗ -0.005 [0.001]∗∗∗ -0.002 [0.002] -0.001 [0.001]
OUT -0.113 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.266 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.002 [0.032] 0.003 [0.026]
Unempl. -0.019 [0.003]∗∗∗ -0.049 [0.005]∗∗∗ 0.043 [0.007]∗∗∗ -0.020 [0.006]∗∗∗
Failures 226,152 88,295 48,496 89,361
Further dummies included for occupation, economic sector, trend per economic sector, region, month, year
Base categories: DD: >96 months, Age 30-34, Medium skill, ES: 1-4 employees, Industry: real estate, renting
and business activities, Occupation: (simple) manual labour , Year 2000, Month January
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
Data: IABS 1975-2004 and authors’ calculations.
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Table A.5: Hazard rate model for the service sector (II)
Sep EE EU EN
DD: 0-6 1.183 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.989 [0.015]∗∗∗ 1.974 [0.025]∗∗∗ 0.941 [0.015]∗∗∗
DD: 7-12 1.135 [0.010]∗∗∗ 1.124 [0.015]∗∗∗ 2.294 [0.024]∗∗∗ 0.561 [0.015]∗∗∗
DD: 13-36 0.620 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.753 [0.014]∗∗∗ 1.413 [0.024]∗∗∗ 0.236 [0.014]∗∗∗
DD: 37-96 0.249 [0.010]∗∗∗ 0.395 [0.014]∗∗∗ 0.657 [0.025]∗∗∗ 0.056 [0.013]∗∗∗
Male: yes -0.149 [0.006]∗∗∗ 0.228 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.230 [0.013]∗∗∗ -0.524 [0.010]∗∗∗
Age 18-24 0.177 [0.008]∗∗∗ 0.263 [0.013]∗∗∗ 0.138 [0.020]∗∗∗ 0.159 [0.0139]∗∗∗
Age 25-29 0.069 [0.008]∗∗∗ 0.142 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.003 [0.019] 0.032 [0.012]∗∗
Age 35-39 -0.166 [0.008]∗∗∗ -0.091 [0.012]∗∗∗ -0.016 [0.019] -0.327 [0.014]∗∗∗
Age 40-44 -0.329 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.175 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.071 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.687 [0.017]∗∗∗
Age 45-49 -0.398 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.255 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.027 [0.022] -0.814 [0.018]∗∗∗
Age 50-54 -0.400 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.341 [0.015]∗∗∗ 0.064 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.767 [0.019]∗∗∗
Age 55-59 -0.057 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.525 [0.018]∗∗∗ 0.738 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.162 [0.017]∗∗∗
Age 60-65 0.982 [0.012]∗∗∗ -0.868 [0.037]∗∗∗ 0.887 [0.036]∗∗∗ 1.841 [0.019]∗∗∗
Foreign: yes 0.251 [0.010]∗∗∗ -0.074 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.026 [0.027] 0.694 [0.017]∗∗∗
Low skill 0.301 [0.009]∗∗∗ 0.048 [0.016]∗∗∗ 0.355 [0.020]∗∗∗ 0.521 [0.015]∗∗∗
High skill 0.032 [0.011]∗∗∗ 0.093 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.168 [0.029]∗∗∗ 0.086 [0.020]∗∗∗
ES: 5-9 -0.257 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.255 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.351 [0.019]∗∗∗ -0.221 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 10-19 -0.280 [0.009]∗∗∗ 0.015 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.450 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.233 [0.017]∗∗∗
ES: 20-49 -0.305 [0.008]∗∗∗ -0.246 [0.013]∗∗∗ -0.535 [0.018]∗∗∗ -0.247 [0.015]∗∗∗
ES: 50-99 -0.296 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.227 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.636 [0.020]∗∗∗ -0.197 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 100-199 -0.330 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.260 [0.015]∗∗∗ -0.732 [0.021]∗∗∗ -0.222 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 200-499 -0.384 [0.009]∗∗∗ -0.302 [0.014]∗∗∗ -0.846 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.283 [0.016]∗∗∗
ES: 500-999 -0.436 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.332 [0.017]∗∗∗ -1.012 [0.028]∗∗∗ -0.313 [0.019]∗∗∗
ES: 1000-4999 -0.470 [0.011]∗∗∗ -0.365 [0.017]∗∗∗ -1.125 [0.029]∗∗∗ -0.299 [0.019]∗∗∗
ES: >5000 -0.456 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.360 [0.033]∗∗∗ -1.217 [0.064]∗∗∗ -0.284 [0.037]∗∗∗
K/Y 0.248 [0.059]∗∗∗ 0.719 [0.087]∗∗∗ -0.020 [0.148] -0.009 [0.103]
Prod. value -0.000 [0.000]∗∗∗ 0.000 [0.000]∗∗∗ 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000]
OUT*low -.129 [0.016]∗∗∗ -0.257 [0.025]∗∗∗ -0.052 [.035] 0.013 [0.028]
OUT*med -0.107 [0.022]∗∗∗ -0.271 [0.023]∗∗∗ 0.013 [0.032] 0.011 [0.026]
OUT*high -0.141 [0.017]∗∗∗ -0.238 [0.025]∗∗∗ -0.117 [0.039]∗∗∗ -0.129 [0.030]∗∗∗
Unempl. -0.019 [0.003]∗∗∗ -0.049 [0.005]∗∗∗ 0.043 [0.007]∗∗∗ -0.020 [0.006]∗∗∗
Failures 226,152 88,295 48,496 89,361
Further dummies included for occupation, economic sector, trend per economic sector, region, month, year
Base categories: DD: >96 months, Age 30-34, Medium skill, ES: 1-4 employees, Industry: real estate, renting
and business activities, Occupation: (simple) manual labour , Year 2000, Month January
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
Data: IABS 1975-2004 and authors’ calculations.
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